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JURISDICTION
Appellees USAA Casualty Insurance Company (USAA) and Kenneth Riddle
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Defendants) acknowledge the Millers' position that
this Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). As set
forth below, Defendants challenge the Court's jurisdiction on the grounds that the Millers'
Notice of Appeal was not filed timely. Otherwise, Defendants agree with the Millers'
jurisdictional statement.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review with the appropriate standard of review
for each issue:
1.

Whether the Millers' March 23, 2000 Notice of Appeal and March 24, 2000

Amended Notice of Appeal were untimely, thus depriving this Court of jurisdiction to hear
their appeal because the Notices were not filed within 30 days after the entry of the trial
court's January 22, 1999 Order denying the Millers' Motion to Alter or Amend the trial
court's November 25, 1998 Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment which dismissed
Counts 2-5 of the Millers' Amended Complaint as a final judgment on the merits, ordered
the case to an appraisal, and allocated to the appraisal panel the discretion to decide which
of the Millers claims to appraise.
Standard of Review: Determining whether a Notice of Appeal is untimely and, as
a consequence, whether this Court lacks jurisdiction, appears to be an issue decided

1

exclusively by this Court as there is no lower court decision to review with respect to the
finite question of this Court's jurisdiction. This Court makes its own review and evaluation
of the record to determine timeliness. See, e.g., Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah
1983). In making its review, the Court is bound by the filing date found on the notice of
appeal transmitted by the trial court to the appellate court. Glezos v. Frontier Investments,
896 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995). The general rule is that to be timely, an appeal must be
filed within 30 days after entry of the order disposing of a motion to alter or amend a
judgment. Guardian State Bank v. Stangl 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989); Regan v. Blount 978 P.2d
1051 (Utah App. 1999). To the extent the Court is required to determine whether an order
is final and appealable, that is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. See In re
M.W., 2000 UT 79 (Utah 2000).
2.

Whether the Millers' March 23, 2000 Notice of Appeal and March 24, 2000

Amended Notice of Appeal were untimely, thus depriving this Court of jurisdiction to hear
their appeal because the Millers did not appeal to the trial court the appraisal panel's award
and decision not to appraise Counts 2-5 of the Millers' Amended Complaint within the 20day time frame mandated by statute, and the Millers' Notices of Appeal were not filed either
within 30 days after the issuance of the appraisal award or within 30 days of the expiration
of the 20-day time frame allowed for appealing the appraisal award to the trial court.
Standard of Review: Same as Issue 1.

2

3.1

Whether the trial court's March 10, 2000, Order correctly denied the Millers'

Motion to Confirm Limited Appraisal Award because (a) USAA had paid the appraisal
award in lull nearly four weeks before the motion to confirm was filed, thus rendering the
motion moot; and (b) the appraisers' and umpire's comments regarding the status of the
Millers' extra-contractual claims were beyond any authority granted by. nor could thev be
binding upon, the trial court.
Standard of itn Ww • Ihe Order denying confirmation involves a legal conclusion,
which is reviewed for correctness. More specifically, the "scope of review is limited to the
legal issue of whether the trial court correctly exercised its authority in confirming, vacating,
or modifying an [appraisal] award." Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998).
4.

Whether the trial court's March 10, 2000, Order correctly denied the Millers'

Motion for Conference and Motion to Schedule Trial on Counts 2-5 of their Amended
Complaint because (a) the trial court had by its Orders of 11/25/98 and 1/22/99 already
dismissed Counts 2-5 as a final judgment on the merits; (b) the appraisal that the trial court
had ordered had been conducted with the appraisers and umpire exercising their discretion
as empowered by the trial court; and, therefore (c) there were no claims remaining before the
trial court for which a conference or a trial was required.

1

Neither Issue 3 or Issue 4 set forth herein needs to be addressed if the Court agrees
with Defendants' position on either Issue 1 or Issue 2.
3

Standard of Review: Although the Millers clearly did not present their requests for
conference and to set trial as a motion for reconsideration, the Order denying the motions
for conference and to set a trial on Counts 2-5 is akin to a denial of a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's Order of Dismissal of Counts 2-5 on the grounds of res
judicata. This court reviews the denial of a motion to reconsider a dispositive order under an
abuse of discretion standard. See In re Rights to Use of All Water. 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-14 through 78-31a-16. See Addendum "A."

2.

Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Addendum '"B."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This case involves a claim by Paul and Kathy Miller under their homeowners'

insurance policy issued by US AA, for first-party insurance policy benefits and other damages
which the Millers claim were incurred as a result of a burst water heater in their home in
Parowan, Utah on or about June 14, 1996.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below and in the Appraisal
Proceedings
This action was commenced by the Millers on February 27, 1998 against USAA and

Mr. Riddle, Case No. 980500124 (hereinafter Miller ID.2 The Millers re-alleged in Counts

2

The Millers had previously filed a first action against USAA on February 10, 1997
(hereinafter Miller I ) R-I. 6-3. We will cite the record in Miller I as wCR-I. page number." and
the record in Miller II as "R-II. page number." Also, the record is paginated so that the first
4

2-5 of their Amended Complaint in Miller II the same basic claims that Judge Eves had
previously dismissed as a final judgment in Miller I, and from which the Millers had not
appealed. In addition, Count 1 of Miller II sought a declaratory judgment regarding the
interpretation of the appraisal clause of the policy. R-II. 12-3. On November 25, 1998,
Judge Braithwaite issued an Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment, which dismissed
Counts 2-5 of the Miller II complaint as a final judgment on the merits based on the doctrine
of res judicata, and which also declared the trial court's interpretation of the policy's
appraisal provision. The court also delegated to two appraisers and an umpire the
responsibility and the discretion to consider the Millers' claims and specifically to decide
which of those claims to appraise. R-II. 991-986.
In response to the court's 11/25/98 Order and Declaratory Judgment the Millers' filed
a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on December 8, 1998 (R-II. 993-992), in which they

page of a pleading or document is identified by the higher chronological number. Hence,
page 6 of the record in Miller I is the first page of the complaint and page 3 is the last page.
We will cite the number of the first page of a pleading or document first for convenience to
the Court and parties in finding the same. USAA filed a motion to dismiss Miller I on March
24, 1997 on the grounds of the insurance policy's appraisal clause (R-I.15-14), which Judge
Eves granted in an Order of Dismissal dated August 21, 1997. R-I. 41. The Millers filed a
Motion for Reinstatement of Miller I on December 3, 1997, (R-I. 55-44), which Judge Eves
denied in a Memorandum Decision dated January 6,1998. R-I.69-67. The Millers then filed
a Motion for Reconsideration on January 23, 1998. (R-I.71-70), which Judge Eves denied
in a Memorandum Opinion dated February 17, 1998. R-I. 89-86. Miller I asserted claims
against USAA for express breach of contract, for first-party bad faith, for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, for damages relating to mental and emotional distress,
physical illness and distress, loss of use of their home, anger, frustration, and embarrassment,
pecuniary loss to their property, and also sought punitive damages. R-I. 6-3. The Millers
never appealed from the Order of Dismissal, the Order denying reinstatement, or the Order
denying reconsideration. .See R-II. 1339, *|J14.
5

expressly requested that Judge Braithwaite instruct the appraisers and umpire that they were
to appraise all of the Millers claims, including those for extra-contractual damages. On
January 22, 1999 Judge Braithwaite issued his Order denying the Millers' motion. R-II.
1073-1071.
The matter proceeded to appraisal, and the appraisers and umpire rendered a ''Limited
Appraisal Award"on December 17,1999, for property damage covered under the policy only.
R-II. 1173. They exercised their discretion not to appraise the Millers' other claims. Id- On
that same day, the Millers demanded that USAA pay the award before December 25, 1999.
See R-II. 1109. USAA made full payment on December 22, 1999. Id. On December 27,
1999, the Millers filed a "Motion for Conference" with the trial court (R-II. 1107-1104), and
on January 18, 2000, they filed a "Motion to Confirm Limited Appraisal Award and to
Schedule Court Trial on 'Extra-Contractual Claims.'" R-II. 1197-1193. Judge Braithwaite
denied both motions in an Order dated March 10, 2000. R-II. 1343-1337.
The Millers filed a Notice of Appeal on March 23, 2000, and an Amended Notice of
Appeal on March 24, 2000. R-II.1348-1345.
C.

Statement of Facts
USAA insured a home owned by Paul and Kathy Miller located at 694 W. 200 N. in

Parowan, Utah. R-II. 1342.3 On or about June 14, 1996, the Millers' 40 gallon water heater
burst allowing water to enter their basement. R-II. 1342. The Millers made a claim under

3

A copy of the policy can be found at R-II. 119-93.
6

the homeowners policy, and a disagreement arose between the Millers and USAA regarding
the amount of damage caused by the water heater burst. R-II. 1342.
USAA retained Kenneth Riddle, an independent adjuster, to estimate the damage to
the Millers' home. R-II. 515-507. Mr. Riddle was unable to find the extensive damages
claimed by the Millers despite performing two inspections of the property. R-II.507-515.4
Mr. Riddle's inspection of the Millers' home revealed minor damage to the basement. R-II.
500. He prepared a written report describing his inspections of the home, to which he
appended photographs, a diagram of the basement floor plan showing areas where he

4

During the second inspection, (at which both Mrs. Miller and a contractor/friend of
the Millers were in attendance) Mrs. Miller told Mr. Riddle that the Millers would "not
accept anything less than the replacement of all the drywall in the basement", even though
Mr. Riddle could find no evidence to support the claim that all the drywall was damaged. R11.134. At this same inspection, Mr. Riddle "asked the [Millers'] contractor to cut into the
wall or ceiling anywhere that.. .[Mrs. Miller] thought there might be hidden damage. [Mrs.
Miller]... showed . . . [the contractor] a place in the ceiling to cut, but the contractor would
not cut the hole because there was no visible water damage to the ceiling drywall." Id. Mr.
Riddle also "removed the ceiling speakers [in the basement] where . . . Mrs. Miller said
water had leaked from the ceiling and there was no evidence of water damage." Id. Mr.
Riddle also asked the contractor to point out the damage in the basement that was the basis
for his (the contractor's) previously submitted $15,585.00 repair estimate. In response, the
contractor admitted that his estimate was a bid he prepared based on the repairs that the
Millers told him they wanted performed—namely, tearing out and replacing all the drywall
and insulation in the entire basement. It was not based on actual findings by the contractor
of water damaged areas that needed repair. See R-II. 135-134.
7

observed damage, and an itemized repair estimate. R-II. 444-434.5 USAA paid the Millers
$1,376.87 to cover the drywall and other damage. R-II. 446, 454.6
Because the Millers continued to claim that the water heater burst had caused damage
inside the basement dry wall, USAA informed them in a letter dated December 6,1996, that
if they wanted to tear out portions of the drywall in their basement to check for further
damages or for mold, that they should notify USAA so it could have an adjuster present. R11.502, 504. Without giving USAA any such notice, however, the Millers' arranged for a

5

The Millers never submitted an estimate from a contractor to USAA identifying the
cost of repairing specifically itemized areas in their home that were damaged by, and needed
to be repaired because of, the water heater bursting. See R-II. 330. 583, 599. 605, 671.
6

The Millers had another flood in their basement in late July 1997 for which they also
made a claim on their USAA policy. Mr. Riddle also inspected their home on this claim.
USAA denied any payment for the 1997 flood because it was not covered under the policy,
and the Millers have never claimed that USAA's denial of coverage was improper. R-II. 922.
In July 1997 (more than a year after the June 1996 water heater flood that is the subject of
this action but before the late July 1997 flood), the Millers commissioned a study of their
home to check for microbiological problems. The most significant type of potentially
dangerous organism for which tests were run is called Stachybotrys, none of which were
found in either the air or the surface materials in the home in July 1997. R-II. 417-410. But
in April 1998 (after the second flood of July 1997 for which no coverage applied) another
study was performed at which time Stachybotrys was detected in the air and on the surface
materials of the home. R-II. 403-392. The Millers' residence was plagued by general
problems with drainage as noted by Defendants' expert. Keith Bird, who inspected the
property in April 1998. Mr. Bird concluded that the damage he saw in the Millers' home was
not caused by the single water heater incident in June 1996. but by either "multiple
exposures/incidents to flooding or continual saturation for many weeks to months." He also
found obvious drainage problems attendant to the home whereby water coming off the roof
or ground water would not drain away from the foundation. Bird found standing water in the
window wells in April 1998 (some 22 months after the water heater incident), thus
reenforcing his opinion that the water heater incident could not be the cause of mold and
dryrot in the Millers' home. See R-II. 535-534 and a copy of Bird's report which by
stipulation has been supplemented to the record.
8

licensed contractor, Kevin Phillips of Owners Dry wall, to inspect the basement and take cutouts from two areas of the basement walls on December 13, 1996. Phillips prepared a letter
report and a general repair estimate dated December 19, 1996. R-II.329. The Millers never
gave USAA a copy of the Owners Dry wall documents until they were produced during the
Miller II litigation. See R-II. 532, 671.
The Millers filed their first lawsuit, Miller L against USAA on February 10,1997. R-I.
6-3. On March 24,1997, USAA filed a motion to dismiss Miller I and invoked the appraisal
clause of the insurance contract. R-I. 15-10.7 In March 1997 USAA appointed Mr. Riddle
to serve as its appraiser and so notified the Millers through their counsel. R-II. 484,482. On
numerous occasions USAA requested that the Millers appoint their appraiser as required
under the terms of the policy. R-II. 484,481-479,466,457. At no time during the pendency
of Miller I did the Millers ever notify USAA or its counsel that they had appointed an
appraiser. See R-II. 484,479,457, 506-504.8 On April 1,1997, the trial court issued a Notice
of Scheduling Conference for May 19,1997 (R-I. 23-22), which was continued by stipulation
of counsel to August 4, 1997. R-I. 25.

7

USAA was represented in Miller I by Robert H. Henderson of the law firm of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau. R-I. 15.
8

Judge Braithwaite expressly found in his November 25,1998 Order of Dismissal and
Declaratory Judgment that the "Plaintiffs have never appointed an appraiser. They have
merely objected to defendant's actions instead. That is not an option for plaintiffs." R-II.
988. (emphasis added.)
9

On May 30, 1997, the Millers' first counsel, Mr. Bertch, filed a Motion for Leave to
Withdraw and an accompanying Affidavit (R-I. 30-26) in which he asserted a breakdown in
the attorney-client relationship, and that the Millers' second counsel, Mr. Hutchins, had
threatened a bar complaint against Mr. Bertch and had also "delayed his [Hutchins'] entry
of appearance, in an apparent effort to force me [Mr. Bertch] to respond to a pending motion
to dismiss, for him [Mr. Hutchins]. R-I. 30-29. On June 5,1997, Mr. Hutchins filed his own
Affidavit in response (R-I. 36-33), in which he, among other things, soundly criticized Mr.
Bertch for failing to protect the Millers' by filing a responsive memo to USAA's motion to
dismiss (which had by that time been pending for more than two months). R-I. 35-34.9
The Millers ultimately failed to respond to the motion to dismiss, and Judge Eves
entered his Order of Dismissal on August 21, 1997, in Miller I. R-I. 41. 10

9

In September 1997, during Mr. Hutchins' relatively short stint as the Millers'
counsel, he told USAA's counsel, Mr. Henderson, that an expert named Steve Vaughn who
Hutchins had asked to inspect the Millers' home agreed with Mr. Riddle's analysis that the
sheet rock did not need to be replaced just because it got wet. R-II. 906. Hutchins also told
Henderson that the Millers might have a claim against the contractors who laid the house's
cement foundation or the manufacturer and/or the installer of the prefab home because
"water is coming in from the outside, or may be coming in through the outside, through either
a crack in the foundation and/or a chink betwixt the prefab and the top of the foundation."
R-II. 905. Obviously, these problems were not a result of the water heater bursting.
10

The Millers have persistently contended that their "efforts" to participate in an
appraisal in Miller I were frustrated because USAA would not agree to their scope and form
of appraisal in light of the breadth of Judge Eves' Order of Dismissal. Appellants' Brief, p.
8, ^f 4 and Add. 5. In fact, however, Judge Eves' order was not entered until nearly five
months after USAA first filed its motion to dismiss. R-I 41. Instead of filing any response
during this more than ample time frame, the Millers' first two lawyers either did nothing or
spent their energy pointing the finger at, and bickering with each other over who should file
a response to the motion. Moreover, while the motion was pending, USAA continued to
10

Three months after the court dismissed Miller I, on December 3, 1997, the Millers
filed a motion to reinstate the case. R-I.55-52. On January 6, 1998, the district court issued
a Memorandum Decision denying Millers' motion for reinstatement, stating, in pertinent
part:
The Court's Order of Dismissal dated August 21, 1997, constituted a
final judgment as it disposed of all pending issues. The defendant's response
to plaintiffs' request for "reinstatement" asserts that this is actually a tardy
motion under Rule 60(b) . . . and should be denied.
The Court agrees that plaintiffs' Motion is governed by Rule 60(b). . .
Accordingly, the Court now denies the plaintiffs' Motion for
Reinstatement. . . .
R-I. 69-66. See Add. "C" attached hereto. The Millers next filed a motion for
reconsideration on January 23, 1998. R-L 71-70.

In its third Memorandum Opinion in

Miller L issued on February 17, 1998, the district court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and stated:
The suit which plaintiffs seek to resurrect has no claim relating to the
interpretation of the appraisal clause. If there is a viable claim of that type,

request that the Millers appoint an appraiser so the appraisal process could proceed. Not only
did the Millers fail to respond to the motion, but they also failed to appoint an appraiser.
R-I. 41; 30-29; 36-33. The Millers ultimately neglected to argue that USAA's motion to
dismiss in Miller I was too broad, or that only their property damage claims should be
dismissed. If, as the Millers apparently now contend, USAA's motion allowed for an overly
broad dismissal order, the Millers could have easily argued that in an opposition
memorandum, which they had nearly five months to submit but never did. It is, moreover,
likely that the entire appraisal could have been completed within that five-month time frame
before any dismissal order was entered, if the Millers would have simply appointed an
appraiser.
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it may be grounds for a separate suit, but it does not justify setting aside a
dismissal judgment in this suit.
R-I. 89-86. On February 27, 1998, the Millers commenced Miller [I, seeking a
declaratory judgment regarding interpretation of the appraisal clause in the insurance policy
and re-alleging the same claims that had been brought and previously dismissed in Miller I.
R-II. 12-3; 30-20. On November 25, 1998, the district court issued its Order of Dismissal
and Declaratory7 Judgment, interpreted the appraisal clause under Count land dismissed, as
a final judgment on the merits, all other claims (Counts 2-5) asserted in Miller II on the
grounds that they were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the same claims either
had, or should have, been brought, and had already been dismissed, in Miller I. The court
assigned the matter to the parties' two appraisers and an umpire, granting to them the
discretion to decide what claims would be appraised. R-II. 991-986. The trial court retained
jurisdiction only for purposes of considering an appeal, if any, by the parties of the appraisal
panel's calculation of the loss under the narrow grounds set forth in Utah's Arbitration Act,
stating as follows:
Finally, the Court directs that after the appraisers and umpire have made a final
calculation of loss, then and only then may their decision be appealed to this
court for modification - - but only within 20 days of the decision The
standard of modification shall be based on "evident mistake" or "evident
miscalculation." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15.
R-II. 987. (emphasis added). The district court also unequivocally held that the Order
of Dismissal in Miller I and its Order dismissing Counts 2-5 of Miller II were both final
judgments on the merits:
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The doctrine of res judicata is clearly applicable to the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss. Counts 2-5 of the Complaint - - relating to accusations of bad faith,
breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
punitive damages - - are effectively the same as both counts of Plaintiff s [sic]
original suit (civ. no. 970500080) dealing with breach of contract and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dismissal in that case constituted
a final judgment on the merits. As such, the parties may not again raise those
issues in this law suit, or raise other issues in this law suit which should have
been raised in the original law suit. . . . Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
granted in full

On the basis of the foregoing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted,
and Counts 2-5 of the Complaint are hereby ordered dismissed as a final
judgment on the merits.
R-II. 991-986. (emphasis added) On December 8, 1998, Millers next filed a Motion
to Alter or Amend [the 11/25/98] Judgment. The district court denied this Motion in an Order
dated January 22, 1999. R-II. 1073-1071. Therein the court rejected the Millers' request that
it order the appraisal panel to appraise all of their claims. Id. The court also made it clear
that the appraisal panel was given wide discretion to determine "which damages or claims
would be appraised." Id. Finally, the Order reiterated that the court retained jurisdiction only
over an appeal from the appraisal panel's calculation pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-1, et seq. Id.
The matter proceeded to appraisal. The Millers' and their appraiser both took the
position that all of the Millers' claims, including all those asserted in Counts 2-5 of their
complaint, were to be addressed in the appraisal proceeding and that awards should be made
thereon. Indeed, the Millers' appraiser submitted an appraisal which did just that. See R11.1260, 1287, 1293. The panel rendered a "Limited Appraisal Award" on December 17,
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1999. R-II.1104.11 The Millers demanded that USAA pay the appraisal award before
December 25,1999. R-II. 1109. USAA made payment on December 22,1999. R-II. 1108.
The Millers did not appeal the appraisal award to the district court or seek
modification of the award within the 20-day time period and pursuant to the procedures
established in the district court's Orders of November 25, 1998, and January 22, 1999.
Appellants' Brief, p. 17, f 21. The 20-day time period for doing so expired on January 6,
2000. R-II. 1259418.
The Millers filed a Notice of Appeal on March 23, 2000, and an Amended Notice of
Appeal on March 24, 2000, more than 13 months after the Order Denying Motion to Alter
or Amend [the 11/25/98] Judgment, and more than 30 days after the January 6. 2000.
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The appraisers and umpire exercised the discretion given them by the trial court and
unanimously decided "to only appraise property damage [claims] within the limits of the
policy", the exact opposite of what the Millers' had requested them to do. The appraisers and
umpire recognized that they did not have the prerogative to dictate to the trial court what
would happen with the Millers" other claims. They simply stated that it was their intent "to
follow any procedure that would allow the Plaintiffs to preserve any properly brought
claims" (emphasis added), and in language unmistakably deferential to the trial court's
ultimate authority they merely vocalized their "belief that extra-contractual claims would
be more appropriately handled in a court setting than an appraisal. R-II. 1193 Because the
Millers' extra-contractual claims were not "properly brought" claims, the appraisers' intent
did not affect the twice-dismissed claims.
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expiration of the time for appealing the appraisal award to the district court.12 R-II. 13451346;1347-1348.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

This court lacks jurisdiction because the Millers' Appeal was filed more

than thirty days after entry of the January 22, 1999 Order denying their Motion to Alter or
Amend the 11/25/98 Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment which (a) dismissed
Counts 2-5 of the Millers' as afinaljudgment on the merits; (b) granted to the appraisers and
umpire the discretion to decide what claims to appraise; and (c) retained jurisdiction in the
trial court only to hear an appeal within 20 days to the appraisal award.
POINT II:

The Millers' failure to appeal the Limited Appraisal Award within the

20-day time limit established by statute and the district court's Order deprives this Court of
jurisdiction. In order to have timely appealed in this Court, the Millers were required to first
appeal the appraisers' and umpire's decision not to appraise their extra-contractual claims
within 20 days to the trial court and on the court's stated standard of review of "evident
mistake" or "evident miscalculation." The Millers5 failure to make any such appeal to the
trial court bars them from appealing to this Court.

12

In the filing of the Amended Notice of Appeal, the Millers recognized that what
they are really appealing are the 11/25/98 Order dismissing their claims as a final judgment
on the merits and the 1/22/99 Order denying their motion to alter or amend the 11/25/98
judgment. Thus, as we discuss in detail below, the issue is whether they have timely
appealed those Orders/Judgments, not whether they filed a timely notice of appeal from the
district court's Order of 3/10/00, which was not an order or judgment of dismissal of their
claims.
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POINT III: The district court's March 10,2000 order correctly denied the Miller's
request to confirm the appraisal award that had been paid by USAA within days of the
award's issuance. Therefore, the Millers' request to confirm the appraisal award was moot.
Additionally, there was no proper reason for confirming the appraisers' £ind umpire's
statements regarding setting the Millers' dismissed extra-contractual claims for trial because
the appraisers and umpire lacked authority to revive the Millers' claims that had been
dismissed by a Utah district court.
POINT IV: The district court's March 10, 2000 order correctly refused to set the
Millers' dismissed claims for trial because the Millers' request for a trial setting was actually
a motion for reconsideration of the district court's earlier dismissal of their extra-contractual
claims. The motion was improper because the court's order of dismissal dismissed all claims
and all parties, and as such, a motion for reconsideration could not revive the claims.
Moreover, the Millers' motion failed to present any new evidence or new law7 which would
compel the court to reconsider its earlier order dismissing the Millers' claims.
POINT V:

The Millers' request for attorney's fees should be denied. The

Defendants prevailed in the district court, and the Millers were sanctioned on one occasion
for attempting to impede the appraisal process as ordered by Judge Braithwaite. The Millers
loiowingly adopted a strategy to seek appraisal of all their claims in the face of the trial
court's clear Order refusing to require the appraisers and umpire to do so, while
simultaneously dismissing all those claims from the litigation on the merits. Instead of
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appealing timely, the Millers arrogated to the appraisal panel the prerogative to tell the trial
court what to do with the dismissed claims. The fact that the court chose not to be so
directed and to rule in favor of Defendants is certainly not grounds to award fees to the
Millers. Such an award would be improper.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE MILLERS5
APPEAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S NOVEMBER 25,1998 ORDER
AND THE JANUARY 22,1999 ORDER BECAUSE THE
APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS WAS NOT TIMELY FILED.
a.

Appeals must be brought within 30 days of entry of a final judgment.

The Millers purport to appeal from, inter alia, the district court's November 25,1998
Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment, and the court's January 22, 1999, Order
denying the Millers' motion to alter or amend the 11/25/98 Order.13 These two orders
combined dismissed as a final judgment on the merits the claims which the Millers are now
seeking to have reinstated.
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Although it is not entirely clear, the fact that the Millers filed their Notice and
Amended Notice of Appeal in both Miller I and Miller II raises the question of whether they
are perhaps attempting to also appeal from the August 21,1997, Order of Dismissal in Miller
I and the orders denying their motions for reinstatement and for reconsideration with respect
thereto. An appeal from the ruling in Miller I would clearly be improper because it would
be filed untimely.
17

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal only if a notice of appeal is
timely filed. See Utah R.App. P. 3(a). Generally, a notice of appeal is timely if filed "within
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R.App. P. 4(a).
The running of the 30-day time for appealing is tolled when a party files a Rule 59 motion
to alter or amend judgment, as the Millers did in the instant case, until the trial court issues
its ruling on that motion. See Regan v. Blount, 978 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1999).
Rule 4(a)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional. .See, e.g.. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36,
37 (Utah 1981); State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah App. 1989) (appellate court lacks
jurisdiction to hear appeal as of right when defendant's notice of appeal is untimely and
defendant failed to file a Rule 4(e) motion to extend); In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287,1289 (Utah
App. 1989).
The 30-day time limit to appeal is strictly construed, and Utah appellate courts have
dismissed cases filed one or two days past the 30 day period. Issacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d
849 (Utah 1983); see also. State v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1118 (Utah App. 1997) (dismissing
appeal for lack of jurisdiction because notice of appeal was filed one day after 30-day time
limit.)
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b.

The district court's January 22,1999 Order denying the Millers9
motion to alter or amend the court's November 25,1998 Order of
Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment in Miller II, which dismissed
Counts 2-5 as afinaljudgment on the merits was a final, appealable
order.

The Millers March 23 and 24, 2000, Notices of Appeal seek reversal of the district
court's refusal to set for trial their extra-contractual and breach of contract claims that the
appraisal panel refused to appraise. However, those claims were dismissed in a final
judgment on the merits as part of the trial court's November 25, 1998, Order of Dismissal
and Declaratory Judgment. Thereafter, the trial court re-affirmed this order in its January 22,
1999, Order denying the Millers' Motion to Alter or Amend the 11/25/98 Judgment. Both
Orders were obviously entered more than 30 days before the Millers filed their notices of
appeal. Even assuming that the Millers' motion to alter or amend tolled the time to appeal
from the November 25,1998 order, this appeal is untimely because the Millers failed to file
an appeal within thirty days after the district court denied the motion to alter or amend.
A final order is defined as either an ''order which disposes of all claims and parties"
or an order properly certified under Rule 54(b) which wholly disposes of a interlocutory
review. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 712 P.2d 243.244 (Utah 1985\ For
an order or judgment to be final, it '"must dispose of the case as to all the parties, and finally
dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case.'" Kennedy v. New
Era Indus.. Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979) (citations omitted). In other words, a
judgment is final when it "ends the controversy between the parties litigant." Id. The Millers
make no distinction between the two types of final orders and argue that, although the district
19

court's order of November 25, 1998, dismissed all of their claims, the order was not
appealable because there was no Rule 54(b) certification.
We submit that such certification was unnecessary here because the Orders dismissing
the Millers' claims as final judgments on the merits combined with the trial court's referral
of the matter to the appraisers * and umpire's discretion for appraisal did dispose of all of the
Millers' claims as to all parties and were, therefore, final, appealable orders. See, Sutter
Corp. v. P & P Industries, Inc., 125 F.3d 914, 918 (5th Cir. 1997) (order to arbitrate was
tantamount to a final order); Brewster v. Woodhaven Building and Development, Inc., 2000
WL 1183367, 6 (Md.) (order to arbitrate was appealable as a final judgment); Lyman v.
Kern, 995 P.2d 504, 505 (N.M. 2000) (order compelling the parties to arbitrate was a final
order from which Defendants were obligated to appeal within thirty days).
The Lyman case is particularly instructive. The parties' dispute arose out of an
automobile accident. After an action was filed, the trial court, over Defendants' objection,
ordered the parties to arbitrate the dispute as to "all issues between the parties." 995 P.2d at
505. The Defendants claimed that they had not agreed to binding arbitration and thus
opposed the entry of the order. Like the Millers in the instant case, the Defendants in Lyman
then filed motions for "presentment" and reconsideration of the trial court's order for
arbitration, which were denied. The defendants did not appeal the order at that time, the
matter was arbitrated, the district court confirmed an award for the plaintiff, and the
Defendants then appealed.
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The issue on appeal was "whether the trial court's order compelling the parties to
arbitrate was a final order from which the Defendants must have appealed within thirty
days." Id. at 506. The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that if the order was a final
one, then the defendants' appeal was untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the appeal.
The court explained that a final order is one in which all the issues of law and fact
have been determined and the case is disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent
possible. The court also noted that the district court's order compelling arbitration stated that
all issues before it were referred to arbitration, showing that the court divested itself of any
further power to address any issue of law or fact through its order to arbitrate. Therefore, the
order compelling arbitration was final. Moreover, the court found that the "Defendants'
motions for presentment and reconsideration [of the arbitration order] indicated that they
were aware of the impact of the referral of the case to arbitration for the ultimate
determination of the merits of the case. Defendants strenuously argued at the hearings on
both motions that they did not agree to binding arbitration . . . . Despite these arguments,
Defendants did not seek to appeal from this order and instead submitted names of arbitrators
and proceeded to arbitration." 995 P.2d at 506.
Like Lyman, the instant case also deals with a final order compelling the parties to
resolve their dispute through appraisal. The orders dismissing Miller I and Miller II were
each explicit in ordering appraisal as a means of resolving the matter. The Miller II orders
clearly granted the appraisers and umpire discretion to decide whether to determine all claims
21

and to resolve all issues between the parties.14 The Millers certainly had notice that the
appraisers and umpire were given the discretion to reject consideration of some of their
claims, and, just like the defendants in Lyman, it was the Millers' responsibility to preserve
such claims by a timely appeal. Ultimately, it remains undisputed that the district court,
through referring the case to appraisal, and refusing to address the issues that had been sent
to appraisal, divested itself of all issues in the case.
The district court explicitly ruled that no issues remained before it in its January 22,
1999 Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, when it stated:
The Court's Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment, dated November
25, 1998, was intended to extend to the appraisers and umpire the discretion
to determine which damages or claims would be appraised. The Court refuses
to take away that authority. After the calculation of loss is made by the
appraisers and umpire, and not until that point, if either party is of the view
that the calculation of loss was made in error, an appeal may be made to this
court as provided under the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-1,
et seq. but at this point in time, the Court has made its ruling, and it is
premature to involve the court before the appraisers and umpire have had the
opportunity to perform their duties.

14

Defendants acknowledge that they took the position that the appraisal process was
not the appropriate forum to hear extra-contractual claims. Nonetheless, the trial court gave
discretion to the appraisers and the umpire to decide which claims they would decide and
simultaneously dismissed with prejudice from the litigation all the Millers' claims. The
Millers then voluntarily chose to use the appraisal procedure as the forum in which to present
all their claims. Contrary to their assertion here that they have never had their day in court
on these claims, the Millers are in fact asking this Court to give them two bites at the apple
on these claims. After failing to convince the appraisers and umpire to award them damages
on the extra-contractual claims, the Millers now want a second forum—namely, the trial
court to re-submit the same claims. The fact that they miscalculated how the appraisers and
umpire would exercise their discretion does not mean that the Millers have been denied the
due process right of presenting all their claims.
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Appellants' Brief, Add. 13. Thus, the order denying the Millers' motion to alter or amend
clearly stated that the appraisers and umpire were given discretion to decide which of the
Millers' claims (all or some) to appraise. Furthermore, the court retained jurisdiction not
over any of the Millers' claims, but rather over an appeal from the appraisers' "calculation
of loss." There is no indication that the Court anticipated preserving Counts 2-5 for a de
novo-type resolution after the appraisal. Therefore, the orders were final, appealable orders
which the Millers failed to appeal in a timely manner.15
Moreover, it is clear that the district court implicitly understood, in making its orders
of dismissal and subsequent order denying the Millers' request to reset their allegedly
unresolved claims for trial, that the appraisers might choose not to appraise all of the Millers'
extra-contractual claims. What is important is that the district court provided the Millers with
a forum for full resolution of all of their claims. The Millers took full advantage of that
forum and attempted to convince the appraisers to appraise their extra-contractual claims,
which their appraiser did. The appraisers accepted voluminous briefs from the Millers
regarding those claims and ultimately exercised their discretion only to issue an appraisal of
the property damage claims. The district court then rejected the Millers' appeal for a second,
redundant chance to try their claims.
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Furthermore, the Millers, like the Defendants in Lyman, demonstrated their
complete awareness of the final consequences of the Orders of Dismissal in Miller I and
Miller II by the fact that they made post-order motions in both cases seeking first, to set aside
the dismissal of their extra-contractual claims in Miller I, and second, the trial court's
injunction that the appraisers and umpire were required to appraise their extra-contractual
claims in Miller II.
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Rule 54(b) certification is also inapplicable because Rule 54(b) pertains only to orders
affecting "fewer than all of the claims or parties. . . ." U.R.C.P. 54(b); see also Pate v.
Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984) (" . . . the judgment appealed from must
have been entered on an order that would be appealable but for the fact that other claims or
parties remain in the action/' (Citation omitted.) (emphasis added.))
The district court's March 10,2000 Order Denying Plaintiff s Motion for Conference
and Plaintiffs' Motion to Confirm Limited Appraisal Award and to Schedule Trial (hereafter
"Plaintiffs' Motion for Conference") stated clearly that both the August 21, 1997 Order of
Dismissal in Miller I and the November 25, 1998 Order in Miller II dismissed all of the
Millers' claims as final judgments on the merits:
The doctrine of resjudicata is clearly applicable to Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss. Counts 2-5 of the Complaint - - relating to accusations of bad
faith, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
punitive damages - - are effectively the same as both counts of Plaintiffs'
original suit (civ. no. 970500080) dealing with breach of contract and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dismissal in that case constituted
a final judgment on the merits. As such, the parties may not again raise those
issues in this lawsuit, or raise other issues in this lawsuit which should have
been raised in the original suit. State ex. rel. T.J, v. State, 945 P.2d 158, 162
(Utah App. 1997). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in full.
# * * *

On the basis of the foregoing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted,
and Counts 2-5 of the Complaint are hereby ordered dismissed as a final
judgment on the merits.
See Add. 16, Appellants' Brief, (emphasis added). As final judgments on the merits,
these two Orders of Dismissal were required to be appealed from, if at all, within 30 days
after their entry, or after rulings on post-order motions, neither of which occurred. The
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Millers' brief acknowledges that no appeal was taken until March 23, 2000. The appeal is
clearly out of time and should be dismissed.
In Jacobson v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., I l l F.3d 261 (2ndCir. 1997), a case
analogous to the instant one, the court held that a second lawsuit filed by the insured arising
out of a first-party claim for property damage and other losses, was barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. Jacobson had a homeowner's policy with Fireman's Fund. In April 1989,
Jacobson's dwelling was damaged by a painting contractor who had been hired to apply
wood stain to the house, decks, and fences. Jacobson claimed more than $2,000,000 in
damage to his residence and submitted a claim to Fireman's Fund.
A dispute arose between Jacobson and Fireman's Fund regarding the amount of the
loss. Fireman's Fund invoked the insurance policy's mandatory appraisal process "to
determine the sum payable for losses that were disputed as to either coverage or value." I l l
F.3d at 263. Jacobson initially reflised to take part in the appraisal process and instead filed
a lawsuit in New York state court in September of 1990. The state court judge ordered
Jacobson to participate in the appraisal process set forth in the policy or else his complaint
against Fireman's Fund would be dismissed. Thereafter the appraisal went forward, but the
first umpire failed to perform his duties. Jacobson then attempted to terminate the appraisal
process and proceed with the state court action, "but the state court denied those efforts
(twice) and eventually appointed a new umpire to conduct the ... appraisal process . . . . " Id.
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The second umpire ultimately rendered his decisions which included findings "that
Jacobson's policy did not cover damage to his trees and shrubs; that Jacobson was not
entitled to prejudgment interest; . . . that Jacobson had to pay his own appraiser and half of
the expenses for both the first (abortive) and second appraisals . . ., [and] concluded that
Fireman's Fund's unpaid obligation on the claim amounted to over $300,000 in covered
losses and over $550,000 in contingent costs (including relocation, moving, and storage
expenses, when and if actually incurred)." IcL Thereafter, "Fireman's Fund paid the
remaining covered losses in accordance with [the umpire's] decision." Jacobson and
Fireman's Fund then settled the pending state action pursuant to which "Fireman's Fund
agreed to pay Jacobson the full contingent amount as determined by [the umpire], and
Jacobson agreed to release Fireman's Fund from any further claims for property damage or
living expenses under the policy." Id. However, the release expressly reserved Jacobson's
"right to proceed with any other claims including but not limited to extra contractual liability,
bad faith, claims for alleged unfair claim practices and any other additional claims for alleged
property damages not previously paid by the company . . . . " Id. at 264. [internal quotation
marks omitted] This ended any further proceedings in the state court action. The umpire's
award was never confirmed, nor was any appeal taken from it by Jacobson.
Several months after the conclusion of that action, however, Jacobson filed a second
action in New York state court, which Fireman's Fund subsequently removed to federal
court. In the second action, Jacobson alleged that Fireman's Fund had committed fraud and
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bad faith by knowingly submitting unrealistically low repair estimates, by recommending an
umpire for the first appraisal proceeding who had prior business dealings with Fireman's
Fund and Fireman's Fund's appraiser, and that Fireman's Fund had breached its contract by
refusing to pay Jacobson the amount he was due under the final appraisal unless he agreed
to waive any and all other claims against Fireman's Fund. Jacobson also claimed that each
of these acts was part of a pattern of intentional misconduct which forced him "to incur
substantial legal fees and costs in litigating and arbitrating his claim and suffered a
substantial delay in receiving the full payment to which he was entitled." Id. at 264. [internal
quotation marks omitted]
Fireman's Fund moved to dismiss the second action on the grounds that it was barred
by res judicata. The federal district court granted the motion, and Jacobson appealed. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Like the Millers in the instant case,
Jacobson argued on appeal "that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his bad
faith claims in the state action because ' [t]he appraisal directed by the State Court was
limited to one issue, a determination of the "amount of loss" under the terms of Policy." The
Circuit Court rejected this argument, stating that the umpire's "first report refutes that
contention and makes clear that he was given full power as umpire to decide all relevant
issues, including Jacobson's present claims . . .'" Id at 265-66. [internal quotation marks
omitted] The Court so found despite the absence in the opinion of an indication that the
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umpire's rulings in the state court-ordered appraisal expressly included any evaluation
regarding bad faith or fraud.16
Likewise in the instant case, Judge Braithwaite gave to the appraisers and the umpire
the discretion to determine what claims they would and would not appraise. He did that in
conjunction with his final judgment on the merits dismissing Counts 2 through 5 of Miller
II on the basis of res judicata. The Millers chose to pursue all of their claims through the
appraisal process. They submitted, through their appraiser, an appraisal that covered every
single claim in their case, including bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages,
as well as property losses. They did this with full knowledge that Judge Braithwaite had
already dismissed all of their non-property/extra contractual-type claims as a final judgment
on the merits. Thus, like Mr. Jacobson who had an opportunity to have all his claims heard
through the first state court action and the appraisal process mandated therein, so the Millers
had the same opportunity in this action.
The Second Circuit rejected Jacobson's argument that the umpire's appraisal award
had no res judicata effect because it had never been confirmed, HlF.3dat268, and also held
that Jacobson's failure to appeal the appraisal award to the trial court within the time allowed
by statute barred any further litigation on the claims:

16

The umpire did state in his first report that "Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. and Mr.
Barry Jacobson retained me to resolve on a binding basis a disputed coverage issue and the
cost and interest issue." Id. at 266.
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It is undisputed in this case that Jacobson failed to appeal either
of [the umpire's] determinations within the . . . period of
limitations of...§
7511 (or indeed ever). After the time to
appeal had expired, those determinations - which plainly were
on the merits of the parties' coverage and valuation disputes became "final" and precluded any further litigation of all
issues that were or could have been addressed within the
context of that arbitration proceeding.
111 F.3d at 268. (emphasis added) The Court also held that the release agreement
between Jacobson and Fireman's Fund did not change the outcome from a res judicata
standpoint. The court stated:
Jacobson's remaining claim - that his prior state action never became
"final" for purposes of res judicata because the parties' settlement of that
action expressly preserved his right to assert his present claims - is easily
dismissed. The claim is based on the terms of the limited release, which
carves out any claims for "extra contractual liability, bad faith,... unfair claim
practices," etc.... The district court ruled, however, that "only those claims
that exist under the law may be preserved by an agreement between the
parties; a release does not create or resurrect claims that otherwise do not
lie."... We agree. When the time to appeal [the umpire ys] determinations
expired, those determinations - albeit unconfirmed - became final and
served to bar any subsequent claims grounded on the same transaction or
occurrence. The carve-out of certain claims from the limited release
prevents Fireman's Fund from interposing the defense of release, but it does
not affect the scope of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Id. at 268. (emphasis added) Hence, the Court held that even though Jacobson had
expressly reserved his bad faith and other claims (for which no award was expressly included
in the umpire's decision) as part of the settlement of his first lawsuit against Fireman's Fund,
his failure to appeal the umpire's award within the time frame allowed under the New York
arbitration statute, barred Jacobson from pursuing those reserved claims in a second lawsuit.
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The same situation prevails here. First, the Millers never appealed the dismissal of their
extra-contractual claims as a final judgment on the merits in Miller L notwithstanding their
post-judgment motions which took the position that the Order barred them from pursuing
their extra-contractual claims. Second, they failed to appeal, within the 30-day time frame
allowed by Rule 4, U.R.A.P., the January 22, 1999 Order in Miller II denying their motion
to alter or amend the November 25, 1998 judgment of dismissal on the merits. Third, they
failed to appeal, within the 20-day time frame allowed under Utah's arbitration statute, the
appraisal award in Miller II whereby the appraisal panel refused to consider their nonproperty damage, extra-contractual claims. This third failure to appeal came in the face of
the existing November 25,1998 and January 22,1999 orders dismissing the extra-contractual
claims as a final judgment on the merits. See also Point II, infra.
Consequently, just as Mr. Jacobson's extra contractual claims were barred from being
pursued in his second action, so the Millers claims are barred after having been dismissed in
both Miller I and in Miller II followed by no timely appeals.
c.

The Orders Dismissing the Millers claims as final judgments on the
merits in Miller I and Miller II were not interlocutory orders.

An interlocutory order is defined as an intermediate order of the trial court upon which
further proceedings in the trial court hinge. See e.g., Manwill v. Ovlen 361 P.2d 177, 178
(Utah 1961) (interlocutory appeal is proper "if it appears essential to adjudicate principles
of law or procedure in advance as a necessary foundation upon which the trial court may
proceed"); Osteen v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.. 283 So.2d 379, 381 (Fla.App.1973)
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(review by interlocutory appeal is an accelerated procedure designed to resolve an issue in
question and then return the case to the trial court for further proceedings); Black's Law
Dictionary 815 (6th ed. 1990) ("Interlocutory order" is none which does not finally determine
a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining to the cause, and which
requires further steps to be taken to enable the court to adjudicate the cause on the merits.")
Pursuant to the November 1998 Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment, the district
court retained jurisdiction only over an appeal from the decision of the calculation of the loss
by the appraisal panel:
Finally, the Court directs that after the appraisers and umpire have made a final
calculation of loss, then and only then may their decision be appealed to this
court for modification - - but only within 20 days of the decision.
Add 11, Appellants' Brief, (emphasis added.) The district court thus made it clear that
the Millers' claims were not being retained in anticipation of further litigation, but rather only
to determine whether the appraisers and umpire, in exercising the discretion granted by the
court, had committed an "evident mistake" or an "evident miscalculation". Id.
The district court further unequivocally enunciated that its Order of Dismissal was not
interlocutory by denying the Millers' attempts to reinstate their extra-contractual claims after
the appraisal had ended. The court's March 10, 2000 Order on the Millers' Motion for
Conference stated that:
The Plaintiffs Motion to Set Trial Date on Counts 2-5 of the Complaint in
Miller II is denied on the grounds that Counts 2-5 have previously been
dismissed on the grounds of res judicata as a final judgment on the merits,
because the same claims had previously been dismissed as afinaljudgment on
the merits in Miller I from which the plaintiffs took no appeal, nor did they
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appeal the limited appraisal award to this court, but rather simply demanded
that the amount be paid immediately, which has been done in full.
Add. 16, Appellants' Brief; Unnumbered page between R-II. 1339 and 1338.
POINT II
THE MILLERS FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY APPEAL
OF THE APPRAISAL DECISION.
Even if this Court were to conclude that the orders of dismissal from Miller I and
Miller II were interlocutory orders because of the appraisal process, that process ended on
December 17, 1999, when the appraisal panel rendered its Limited Appraisal Award. The
Millers failed to appeal the Limited Appraisal Award to the district court within the 20-day
time period established by statute and the Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment.
Therefore, assuming, arguendo, that the appraisal process tolled the time for filing an appeal
to the orders of dismissal, the Millers were at the very least required to appeal either within
3 0 days after the Limited Appraisal Award was issued (which would be a dead] ine of January
17,2000), or under a more liberal calculation, within 30 days of the expiration of the 20-day
time period to appeal the appraisal award to the district court (which would be a deadline of
February 7, 2000), both of which deadlines the Millers missed.17

17

The Millers concede that they filed none of the motions that would toll the 30-day
appeal time period after issuance of the appraisal award—namely, Rule 50(b) motions, Rule
52(b) motions to amend or make additional findings of fact, Rule 59 motions to alter or
amend the judgment, and Rule 59 motions for a new trial. The Millers filed a Motion for
Conference and a Motion to Confirm the appraisal award.
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The Millers err in arguing that their Motion for Conference constitutes an appeal of
the appraisal award or that such a motion would preserve their ability to appeal from the
orders dismissing their extra-contractual claims. The Millers assert that one appeals when
one "challenges" a decision. Appellants' Brief, p. 25. Although we do not dispute that
general definition of an appeal, we certainly reject the Millers' interpretation that their
motion for a conference constituted such an appeal or "challenge."18
The Millers' assertion in that regard is belied by their later Motion to Confirm the
same appraisal award. One cannot simultaneously challenge that for which one seeks
confirmation. Yet that is precisely what the Millers are now claiming they did. Specifically,
they assert that their motion for conference should be viewed as a challenge to the
correctness of the very appraisal award for which they not only sought confirmation, but
which they also demanded (on the same day that the award was rendered) be paid within a
week's time. Such schizophrenic positions are untenable.
By demanding and accepting payment of the appraisal award, the Millers acquiesced,
without appeal or challenge, in the appraisers' and umpire's decision not to appraise their
extra-contractual claims. They did this with full knowledge that their extra-contractual
claims had been dismissed by the district court as afinaljudgment on two separate occasions.
18

The Millers' citation (Appellants Brief, p. 27) to Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake
Trappers. Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 947, n. 4 (Utah 1996), has nothing to do with the point that the
Millers are attempting to make. Buzas Baseball does not stand for the proposition that the
Millers' Motion for Conference satisfied the appeal requirement.
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Indeed, they had argued vehemently to the appraisers and umpire to consider and appraise
all such claims. The Millers knowingly elected to seek to have their claims heard by the
appraisal panel, expecting the panel to consider all of the claims, rather than prudently
seeking to appeal the decision of the district court in order to preserve such claims. When
the panel chose not to appraise all of their claims, the Millers could still have appealed that
decision within 20 days to the trial court, but they did not. Thus, this bars their claims from
being reinstated now. Jacobson, supra. I l l F.3d at 268 (;wWhen the time to appeal [the
umpire's] determinations expired, those determinations . . . became final and served to bar
any subsequent claims . . ..").
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S MARCH 10, 2000 ORDER CORRECTLY REFUSED
TO CONFIRM AN APPRAISAL AWARD THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN PAID.
a.

The request to confirm the appraisal was moot.

The only issue that the Millers arguably appealed in a timely manner was the narrow
issue regarding the district court's order refusing to confirm the appraisal award. However,
no reversal or remand of that decision is necessary. This Court has consistently refrained
from adjudicating issues when the underlying case is moot. A case is deemed moot when the
requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.

See Burkett v.

Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989); Jones v. Schwendiman. 721 P.2d 893, 894
(Utah 1986); Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 410-11 (Utah 1982).
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The Millers' request for confirmation of the award, which they admit was promptly
paid in full within days of the award,19 concerned a moot issue because the purpose of
confirmation is to provide a prevailing party in an appraisal with a means of enforcing the
remedy as a judgment creditor. .See e^g,, Mauschbach v. Lemke, 866 P.2d 1146 (Nev. 1994)
(purpose served by entry of judgment on confirmation of arbitration award is that of
providing basis for enforcing the award); H.E. Sargent Inc. v. Town of Millinocket 478
A.2d683(Me. 1984) (same).
The Connecticut Appellate Court so indicated in Amalgamated Transit Union Local
1588 v. Laidlaw Transit Inc., 632 A.2d 713,716 (Conn. App. 1993), in which it reviewed
an appeal from a dispute between a union and an employer concerning the reinstatement of
a union member. The dispute went to arbitration, where the arbitrator determined that the
union member should be reinstated to her former position. Following the decision, the
employer complied and reinstated the union member, but the union nonetheless sought
confirmation. The court found that the appeal regarding confirmation was moot and should
be dismissed.
Likewise, in this case, the Millers concede that the Limited Appraisal Award was paid
in full by USAA within days of the award.20 Confirmation for purposes of allowing the
Millers to enforce the award was mooted when USAA paid. Requiring such awards to be

See Appellants' Brief, Statement of Fact, f 18, p. 16.
Appellants'Brief, p. 16. f 18.
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confirmed after their satisfaction would tax both the time and resources of the courts and
would also force the Defendants to remain involved in litigation even after discharging the
obligation.
b.

The order for appraisal conferred upon the appraisers and uimpire
the discretion to decide what claims they would appraise and to
then appraise them. The order did not empower them to purport
to usurp the court's authority and tell it what to do with claims
previously dismissed on the merits.

The Millers argue that the trial court erred in refusing to reinstate the twice-dismissed
extra-contractual claims, merely because the appraisal panel stated (without authority) that
they intended to preserve "any properly brought claims." Appellants' Brief, Add. 1. In fact,
the appraisers' and umpire's comments that the Millers' extra-contractual claims were better
suited to be heard in a court proceeding, as opposed to an appraisal, were tempered by their
recognition that their opinion only applied to "properly brought claims" (R-II. 1193), an issue
to which they obviously deferred decision to the trial court. See also footnote 8, supra.
Judge Braithwaite addressed this issue in his March 10, 2000, Order in which he held that
the extra-contractual claims were not properly before the court. R-II. 1338. Judge Braithwaite
further unequivocally held that: "The appraisers and umpire were not empowered by this
court to set aside orders of dismissal and final judgments on the merits. The appraisers and
umpire were only empowered and given discretion to decide what would be appraised and
to make an award for the loss caused by the bursting water heater. This the appraisers have
done, and it would be in excess of any jurisdiction granted by this court to them for this court
to allow the setting aside of the final judgments on the merits on the basis of comments
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included in the limited appraisal award." R-II. 1339-unnumbered following page; Addendum
16, Appellants'Brief, ^15.
There is, indeed, no support for the proposition that an appraiser or umpire has
authority to bind a Utah court to act or rule in accordance with their wishes. On the contrary,
the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-1, et seq., expressly grants authority to
"state district courts in Utah" (see § 78-3 la-2(2)) over such appraisers to review and modify
their decisions. Regardless of what the appraisers or umpire thought about the Millers' extracontractual claims, any gratuitous comments appended to their award regarding those claims
exceeded their authority and had no obligatory effect on the district court to act in variance
with its previously issued orders dismissing all such claims. Therefore, the statements of the
appraisers and umpire could not have affected the Millers' rights, and the request to confirm
the award was moot.
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT'S MARCH 10, 2000 ORDER CORRECTLY
REFUSED TO SET COUNTS 2-5 OF THE MILLERS' CLAIMS FOR TRIAL.
Before the Court should even consider the substance of the Millers' claims, it must
conclude that the Millers timely appealed (a) the November 25,1998 Order of Dismissal and
Declaratory Judgment, (b) the January 22, 1999 Order denying their Motion to Alter or
Amend the 11/25/98 Judgment, and (c) the December 17, 1999 Limited Appraisal Award.
Even assuming that the Millers could clear all of these hurdles, which we submit they cannot,
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their appeal of the trial court's March 10,2000 Order denying their request to set Counts 2-5
for trial also fails on the merits.
a.

The Millers5 motion for conference and motion to set their claims
for trial were motions for reconsideration of the orders dismissing
their claims.

The district court's orders, including the November 25. 1998 Order of Dismissal and
Declaratory Judgment and the following order on the Millers' Motion to Alter or Amend the
judgment made it clear that counts 2-5 were dismissed as a final judgment on the merits.21
The Millers sought to have the appraisers and umpire appraise all of their claims, and
presented all of their evidence regarding those claims to the appraisers without any thought
for preserving those claims in court. It was only after the appraisers refused to appraise their
extra-contractual claims, that the Miller attempted to resurrect their twice-dismissed claims.
They chose to attempt to revive their claims through a procedurally unusual "Motion for
Conference" in which they asked the Court to reschedule their extra-contractual claims:
As such, plaintiff [sic] respectfully requests a conference to allow the parties
to confer with the court and receive direction and scheduling by which the
"extra-contractual claims" will be resolved22

21

Specifically, the Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment stated "Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss is granted, and counts 2-5 of the Complaint are hereby dismissed as a final
judgment on the merits." See Add. 11, Appellants' Brief. The Order Denyiag Plaintiffs
[sic] Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment stated "at this point and time, the Court has made
its ruling . . . ." See Add. 13, Appellants' Brief.
22

See, Add. 14, Appellants Brief, (emphasis added)
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The Millers' motion to confirm and schedule trial for the extra-contractual claims was more
explicit in its demand that the district court schedule a trial for their extra-contractual
claims.23 Although they certainly did not style their requests as motions to reconsider, the
Millers apparently recognized, albeit belatedly, that in order to schedule their claims for trial,
the district court would have to reconsider and reverse its order dismissing the claims as a
final judgment on the merits.
While not expressly authorized, motions to reconsider are authorized by implication
under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to allow for the possibility of a judge
changing his or her mind in cases involving multiple claims and multiple parties. Salt Lake
Citv Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah App. 1988). Motions for
reconsideration are permitted in cases where less than all claims are decided in some type of
dispositive motion and authorize a court to readjust prior rulings in complex cases as
subsequent developments in the case might warrant change. See, IdL at fn. 5. However,
motions for reconsideration are not available in cases where all claims have been decided:
When an entire case has been argued and decided, the judge has presumably
heard all there is to hear and the parties have presumably offered all
appropriate guidance. Once the judge has decided, the system assumes that he
or she has decided correctly and would decide the same way again.
Reconsideration requests in that situation are frowned on. The occasional
reversal on appeal is a price the system is pleased to bear in exchange for being
free of the burden of reconsideration in the vast majority of cases where the
correct result was reached and would be reached again on reconsideration, rereconsideration, and reconsideration of the re-reconsideration,

23

See, Add. 15, Appellants Brief, p. 1-2.
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Id. In the instant case (as argued above in Point Lb., supra), the district court's Order
of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment disposed of all claims and all parties before the court
and, therefore, a request for reconsideration of the order was inappropriate

In order to

preserve any right to those claims, the Millers were required to appeal the trial court's
dismissal of the claims. The Millers cannot revive those claims by way of a motion to
reconsider and the district court's ruling denying the motion for conference and motion to
set trial was appropriate.
b.

The Millers' motion for conference and motion to set their claims
for trial failed to raise new issues of law or fact and failed to raise
an issue for reconsideration.

Assuming arguendo that the district court's orders did not dismiss all of the Millers'
claims, and a motion for reconsideration was a viable option, the Millers' motions were,
nevertheless, correctly denied by the district court because they failed to present any new
facts or law that would necessitate a change in the court's decision.
In a motion for reconsideration, a litigant seeking revision and reversal must
demonstrate a reason for the request. U.P.C.. Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 990 P.2d 945,
958-59 (Utah App. 1999). The Millers' motions presented the district court with no reason
for the request other than the argument that the appraisal did not go the way 1hey wanted it
to. The district court recognized that the appraisers performed the task that had been
assigned to them and exercised the discretion to determine which claims they would hear,
and value those claims. There was no justifiable reason for reconsidering the court's
dispositive Order dismissing the Millers' extra-contractual claims because the appraisers and
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umpire had done precisely what the trial court assigned to them, and the Millers had
thereafter deliberately neglected to avail themselves of the very procedure provided by the
court-namely the 20-day appeal of the appraisal award, to preserve any possible remaining
issue. Because the Millers failed to present the district court with a valid reason for
reconsideration, the trial court's denial of their motions was not an abuse of discretion and
should be affirmed. See In re Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999).
c.

If the Millers wished to preserve their claims in court, they were
obligated to take steps to preserve those claims in the event that the
appraisal panel decided not to consider them.

The Millers argue that the trial court should have reinstated their twice dismissed
extra-contractual claims because the appraisal panel decided not to appraise the claims.
However, the Millers failed to take steps to preserve the claims, and the district court had no
legal reason to reinstate claims that the Millers failed to preserve. See Point I, supra. When
the district court issued its Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment, the court gave the
appraisers the discretion to consider which claims its would decide. The Order of Dismissal
and Declaratory Judgment also dismissed the Millers' claims as a final judgment on the
merits. Instead of appealing the Order of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment in order to
seek preservation of their claims, the Millers placed all their eggs into the appraisal basket.
It was the Millers' approach that the appraisal be "all inclusive" and that the appraisers and
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umpire should consider all of their claims.24 Obviously, the appraisal panel decided not to
appraise all of the Millers5 claims.
At that point, the Millers were obligated, under the terms of the district court's Order
of Dismissal and Declaratory Judgment, to appeal to the district court within 20 days of the
issuance of the Limited Appraisal Award to ask the court to order the appraisal panel to
consider their extra-contractual claims based on "evident mistake." Instead, the Millers filed,
after the 20-day period had run, a motion to reset their extra-contractual and other
(unspecified) claims for trial. However, the trial court had already dismissed those claims
on the merits and correctly refused to set them for trial.
d.

Because the Millers presented all of their claims to the appraisal
panel, re-litigation of the claims would be barred based on the
doctrine of res judicata.

The Millers assert that the trial court should have scheduled their extra-contractual
claims for trial. Although we have shown that these claims were lost because of the Millers'
failure to preserve them, the doctrine of res judicata provides an additional reason for
denying the Millers any re-litigation of their claims.
Res judicata prevents the re-adjudication of issues previously decided as well as
issues that could have been brought in a prior action. See Madsenv. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245,
247 (Utah 1988); Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme. Inc.. 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983).

24

The Millers' belief is evidenced by their Motion to Confirm (R-II. 1266-1194), in
which they assert in Statement of Fact <[ 11 (a), that "[t]he court ruled that the appraisal should
be all inclusive." The Millers also indicate that their appointed appraiser appraised all of
their claims. R-II. 1260,1 13.
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The doctrine is premised on the principle that a controversy should be adjudicated only once.
Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Utah 1992).
Several jurisdictions have held that a final arbitration award (even one never reviewed
by any court) is accorded res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in much the same manner
as a judgment of a court. See Hartford Ace. & Indem. v. Columbia Cas. Co.. 98 F.Supp.2d
251, 255 (D.Conn. 2000); Wailua Associates v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 27 F.Supp.2d 1211
(D. Hawaii 1998) (doctrines of issue and claim preclusion barred relitigation of damage and
repair figures calculated by arbitrators); Thibodeau v. Crum, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 27 (1992)
(unconfirmed award in private arbitration between homeowner and general contractor is res
judicata barring homeowner's identical claim against sub-contractor); Miles v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 589 N.E.2d 314 (Mass. 1992) ("A decision rendered by an arbitrator can have
preclusive effect in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies."); See also.
Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration (1988) 35
UCLA L.Rev. 623, 667; Horishi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using
Preclusion to Shape Procedural Choices, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 29 (1988).
Res judicata embraces two distinct doctrines: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). Claim preclusion operates as a
complete bar to a second action based on claims that were, or could have been, raised in a
prior action. See id. Claim preclusion bars a second action if the suit in which that cause of
action is being asserted and the prior action satisfies three requirements. First, both cases
must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred
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must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could or should have been
raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits. Id, Accord, American Estate Mgmt. Corp. v. International Inv. & Dev. Corp., 1999
UTApp765,f 6,986 P.2d 765.
It is undisputed that the same parties involved in the appraisal procedure, namely the
Millers, USAA, and Mr. Riddle, would be parties to any action brought by the Millers if the
case were remanded to district court. Therefore, the first elements of claim preclusion is
met.
Second, the Millers' claims to the district court on remand would be the same claims
that they argued to the appraisal panel. The Millers admitted that they expected the appraisal
panel to consider all of their claims, and the claims were extensively briefed and argued to
the appraisal panel. The Limited Appraisal Award shows that those issues were addressed
in that proceeding.
The third element of claim preclusion is also present as there was a final judgment on
the merits issued by the appraisal panel, notwithstanding the Millers' likely argument to the
contrary based on the panel's decision not to appraise all of their claims. A final judgment
on the merits is a decision that "dispose[d] of all claims and parties," see General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 712 P.2d 243, 244 (Utah 1985). The Limited Appraisal
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Award met that criterion because it disposed of all the claims and parties before it and was
a decision that the Millers could have appealed to the district court.25
Although the district court's order denying the Millers' motion to set their claims for
trial did not state that doing so would violate the doctrine of res judicata because the claims
were fully litigated before the appraisal panel, this Court may affirm the decision of a trial
court based on other grounds. See e.g.. Union Pac. RR. Co. v. Utah St. Tax Comm'n., 999
P.2d 17 (Utah 2000); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988)
(Utah appellate courts may affirm trial court decisions on any available grounds.) Therefore,
because remanding the claims that the Millers seek to reinstate would violate the doctrine
of res judicata, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision denying the Millers' motion
to set a trial for their extra-contractual claims.
POINT V:
THE MILLERS' REQUEST FOR AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE DENIED.
Even though the district court ruled against them on every dispositive motion (except
their request for a declaratory judgment, which was granted only in part) in the proceedings

25

Indeed, the Second Circuit in Jacobson, supra, made this precise holding: "It is
undisputed that Jacobson failed to appeal either of [the umpire's] determinations within the
... period of limitations of [New York statute] (or indeed ever). After the time to appeal had
expired, those determinations -which plainly were on the merits of the parties' coverage and
valuation disputes - became "final" and precluded any further litigation of all issues that
were or could have been addressed within the context of that arbitration proceeding." 111 F.
3d at 268.
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below, and in one instance imposed sanctions against them for attempting to impede the
appraisal process,26 the Millers boldly claim the right to attorney's fees because Defendants
allegedly frustrated the appraisal process.27 The Millers' claim is not supported by the facts
in the record.
Defendants readily admit that they opposed the Millers' position with regard to the
amount of damages claimed. However, Defendants have had, from the very genesis of this
action, a good-faith basis for disputing the Millers' overreaching claims. No evidence
resulting from the two separate investigations by Kenneth Riddle of the Millers' home near
the time when the water heater burst or the investigation by Keith T. Bird justified the
damages claimed by the Millers. In fact substantial evidence supported a conclusion that the
Millers' claimed damages arose out of the poor construction of their home. Nor did the
Millers provide Defendants any evidence that they were entitled to the amount of
compensation they were claiming. Indeed, as explained above in the Defendants' Statement
of Facts, pp. 6-9, the overwhelming evidence showed that the Millers suffered very minor
damage as a result of the water heater burst.

26

See, Add. 13, p. 2, Appellants' Brief, Order Denying Plaintiffs [sic] Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment, in which the Judge Braithwaite notes that "this is the second time
that the plaintiffs [not USAA or Mr. Riddle] have attempted to wpre-empt' the appraisal
process."
27

It is significant to note that the district court disagreed with the Millers' assertions
in their motion for conference and motion for confirmation and denied the Millers' request
for attorneys fees in that instance. See, Add. 16, Appellants' Brief.
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Furthermore, there is no justification for the claim that Defendants wrongfully,
unfairly or prejudicially interfered with the appraisal process. When USAA invoked the
appraisal clause in March 1997 in Miller I, it immediately selected an appraiser in order to
quickly resolve the matter. Conversely, the Millers, as of late November 1998, had still not
appointed an appraiser,28 even though they were into their second lawsuit. Eventually, the
district court imposed sanctions against the Millers for their dilatory actions and refusal to
obey the court's order to appraise. Indeed, the record is replete with pleas from USAA's
counsel in Miller I, for example, to the Millers' counsel that they name an appraiser so the
appraisal process could proceed. R-II. 484, 481-479, 466, 457.29
"In Utah, attorney fees are generally awardable only if authorized by statute or by
contract." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). Attorney fees are
authorized by the Utah Arbitration Act, section 78-3 la-16 which provides:
An award which is confirmed, modified, or corrected by the court shall be
treated and enforced in all respects as a judgment. Costs incurred incident to

28

See note 8, supra, where we cite Judge Braithwaite's finding in the 11/25/98 Order
and Declaratory Judgment that the Millers had "never" appointed an appraiser.
29

Moreover, the Millers' contention that they were thwarted in Miller I because
USAA would not agree that all their claims needed to be appraised due to the breadth of
Judge Eves' dismissal order, sounds empty indeed given that USAA's motion to dismiss sat
for nearly five months without any response from the Millers during part of which time their
first two lawyers quibbled over which of them was supposed to file a response while
contemporaneously failing to appoint an appraiser. The Millers had more than ample time
to submit any appropriate opposition memorandum. During the five month period while the
motion sat unopposed, USAA's counsel consistently requested that the Millers appoint an
appraiser so that the appraisal process could move forward. See also fn. 10, supra.
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any motion authorized by this chapter, including a reasonable attorney's fee,
unless precluded by the arbitration agreement, may be awarded by the court.
(Emphasis added). However, there is no basis for awarding the Millers attorney's
fees for pursuing the moot issue of confirmation of an award which had already been paid.
The district court agreed with the Defendants' position and ruled that the issue of
confirmation was moot. As shown above, the order ruling that confirmation was moot was
correct. Because the appraisal award had been paid by USAA within days of the award,
confirmation of the award, and all of the Millers' efforts to have the award confirmed, failed
to affect the rights of the parties, and there was no justifiable reason to confirm the award.
As also indicated by use of the word u may" in the statute, an award of fees is discretionary,
not mandatory, and that discretion should be exercised here in denying any fees.
The Millers argue that they should receive an award of attorney's fees and costs
incurred since August 21, 1997. There is clearly no statutory or contractual basis for such
an award, nor do the Millers cite any provision or authority which would allow them to
receive such an award.30

30

With regard to the Millers' accusation regarding the Defendants' Motion to Strike,
Motion for Summary Disposition, and opposition to the Millers' designation of the record,
those motions have been reviewed by the Court and decisions rendered. Defendants were
instructed to brief the issues raised in their motion for summary disposition, so we assume
this Court did not consider them to be frivolous. As to the motion to strike and opposition to
designation of the record, Defendants genuinely questioned why Miller I's record was being
designated. We accept the Court's decision in that regard, but we were not in any way
pursuing a frivolous position by raising the issue.
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The Millers' request for attorney's fees should be denied as Defendants should not,
in effect, be sanctioned for presenting law and facts that supports their position and opposes
the Millers' claims.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully request that the Court find that it lacks jurisdiction because
the Millers' failed to timely appeal and affirm the decisions of the district court in all
respects, and deny the Millers' request to remand their dismissed claims for trial. Defendants
also respectfully request that the Court deny the Millers' request for attorney's fees.
DATED this

-^

day of October, 2000,
STRONG & HANNI

Bwy ^WAA
Stuart H. Schultz
Peter H. Barlow

49

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that 2 true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEES USAA CASUALTY COMPANY AND KENNETH RIDDLE were
mailed, postage prepaid, on the

D

day of October, 2000.

Lynn B. Larsen, Esq.
349 South 200 East, Suite 670
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff

1147 996

.4.

ADDENDA

Exhibit A

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14: Vacation of the award by court.
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for vacation of
the award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an arbitrator was guilty of
misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any party;
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to the
substantial prejudice of the rights of a party; or
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the arbitration proceeding.
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall be made to the court within 20 days after a copy
of the award is served upon the moving party, or if predicated upon corruption, fraud, or
other undue means, within 20 days after the grounds are known or should have been
known.
(3) If an award is vacated on grounds other than in Subsection (l)(e), the court may
order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the arbitration agreement
or by the court. Arbitrators chosen by the court shall be found qualified to arbitrate the
issues involved. The time for making an award, if specified in the arbitration agreement,
is applicable to a rearbitration proceeding. If not specified, the court shall order the award
upon rearbitration to be made within a reasonable time. The time for making an award

under a rearbitration proceeding commences on the date of the court's order for
rearbitration.
(4) If the motion to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the award is
pending, the court shall confirm the award.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-14.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-15: Modification of award by court.

(1) Upon motion made within 20 days after a copy of the award is served upon the
moving party, the court shall modify or correct the award if it appears:
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the
description of any person or property referred to in the award;
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if the award can
be corrected without affecting the merits of the award upon the issues submitted; or
(c) the award is imperfect as to form.
(2) If the motion is granted, the court shall modify and correct the award and confirm it as
modified and corrected. Otherwise, the court shall deny the motion and confirm the award
of the arbitrators.
(3) A motion to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative with a
motion to vacate the award.
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-15.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-16: Award as judgment.

An award which is confirmed, modified, or corrected by the court shall be treated
and enforced in all respects as a judgment. Costs incurred incident to any motion
authorized by this chapter, including a reasonable attorney's fee, unless precluded by the
arbitration agreement, may be awarded by the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-16.

Exhibit B

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in
a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2)
under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to
alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying
any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure is filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial. A notice of appeal
filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice
of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of
the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this

rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but
before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed after
such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule,
whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A
motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall
be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No
extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in an institution
files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is
timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last
day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration
setting forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a
notice of appeal is filed in the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period

provided in paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice
of appeal.
U.R.A.P. 4.

Exhibit C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL MILLER and KATHY MILLER,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 930SQfi080£Y'j'r
?

vs.

1

USAA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE,

M 1L }*
JAN 1 6 199P

Defendant.

zz^zziz::

This matter came before the Court for decision on plaintiffs' Motion for Reinstatement.
The matter was submitted by notice on January 6, 1998. The Court has reviewed the file and
now enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order.

FACTS
1. On February 10, 1997, plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging that defendant had
failed to pay for damages covered by their insurance policy and had thus breached the
contract. Plaintiffs also claimed defendant's refusal to pay for the damages constituted an
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
2. On March 24, 1997, after being served with a Summons, the defendant filed a
Motion to Dismiss asserting that the case should be dismissed because the resolution of
plaintiffs' claims should be regulated by the "appraisal clause" of the insurance contract.

00069

-23. On August 11, 1997, defendant filed a Notice to Submit seeking a decision on the
March Motion to Dismiss. Notice was sent to plaintiffs that the matter had been submitted for
decision.
4. On August 21, 1997, the Court's Order of Dismissal was filed and mailed to all
parties. Plaintiffs had never filed an objection or any response to the Motion to Dismiss even
though it had been pending for 5 months.
5. On December 3, 1997, the plaintiffs filed the currently pending Motion for
Reinstatement. Defendant has opposed "reinstatement".

Legal Analysis
The Court's Order of Dismissal dated August 21, 1997, constituted a final judgment as
it disposed of all pending issues. The defendant's response to plaintiffs' request for
"reinstatement" asserts that this is actually a tardy motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and should be denied.
The Court agrees that plaintiffs' Motion is governed by Rule 60(b). In essence
plaintiffs now seek to have their dismissed law suit resurrected because defendant has not been
willing to agree to their theory of how the appraisal clause should apply in this case. The
plaintiffs have not specified which provision of Rule 60(b) they wish to rely upon to set aside
the Court's dismissal of the action.
Accordingly, the Court now denies plaintiffs' Motion for Reinstatement. Plaintiffs
have failed to support their motion with any reference to Rule 60(b). In addition, the issue of
how

000
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the appraisal clause should be interpreted was not a claim raised in the dismissed lawsuit.
There was no request for declaratory relief in that case.

Summary
The plaintiffs' Motion for Reinstatement is denied because there has been no showing
that the Court's Order of Dismissal should be set aside.
DATED this 6th day of January 1998.

^

J.miLlP

j£^r&4-

EVES, Wstrict Court Judge
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I hereby certify that on this 6th day of January 1998,1 mailed true and correct copies
of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Lynn B. Larsen, Esq.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
600 Gateway Tower East
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Robert H. Henderson, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk
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